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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STA1'E OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellant.
Case No.

vs.

12373

JOHN EDWARD COWAN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, John Edward Cowan, appeals from the
finding of guilty of the sale of marijuana and the sentence imposed thereon in the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER

COURT

On the 19th day of October, 1970, the Appellant,
John Edward Cowan, having been convicted by a jury
for the sale of marijuana, was sentenced to the Utah
8tate Prison for the felony offense alleged against him.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant asks this Court to remand the case for
rt>trial or for resentencing or dismiss the conviction for
1

the sale of marijuana and the sentence imposed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, John Edward Cowan, accompanied his
brother-in-law, Lynn Livingston to the Maltair Lanes
on the 15th day of February, 1970. There the DPfendant
chanced to meet an old school acquaintan<>e, Ron Bridgeforth, and spoke with him. On the way home the Defendant's brother-in-law, Lynn Livingston, who Defen<lant knew was at that time employed by the Salt Lake
City Police Department as an informant, told the
Defendant that "they" had a buy against Ron Bridgeforth (T. p. 85).
On the day following the meeting at the Maltair
Lanes the Defendant contacted Ron Bridgeforth and
told him that Lynn Livingston was a police informant
(T. p. 79).
Ron Bridgeforth, after discovering that the Defendant would not keep Lynn Livingston's cover in confidence and with no "independent knowledge or information" that Defendant "was selling narcotics" (T. p.
82), contacted officer Steward who arranged a meeting
with Charles Bullock, Harry Sumega and Lynn
ton. At that meeting they discussed how to "build" a
case against the Defendant (T. p. 82). The motive of
the agents was apparently to obtain the Defendant's
services as an infonnant.
Ron Bridgeforth then contacted the Defendant and
was refused on four separate occasions (T. p. 80). Thr
2

Defendant was hesitant to sell marijuana according to
the testimony of Mr. Bridgeforth (T. p. 80).
On the fifth occasion the Defendant was prevailed
upon and on February 23, 1970, Ron Bridgeforth was
able to purchase the samples marked exhibits P. 2-6
which were later admitted at trial.
Exhibits P. 2-6 were examined by Buddy R. Goldston, a chemist working for the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs. He stated that he analyzed the contents of those exhibits and found each to contain "Cannabis Sativa" (T. p. 70). The chemist characterized
"Cannabis Sativa" otherwise known as marijuana as a
narcotic drug.
Although the Defendent had informed the jury that
he intended to rely on the defense of entrapment (T. 78),
the Court refused to allow an instruction as to the law
of entrapment. In conference with counsel the Court
indicated that the Defendant must admit doing the acts
before the issue of entrapment can be raised (T. 91).
The Defendant made an appropriate exception (T. 93)
and submitted his proposed instruction ( T. 93). The
jury was instructed, retired and returned a verdict of
guilty.
On October 21, 1970, the Defendant filed a Motion
for New Trial based on newly discovered evidence. On
October 27, 1970, the Defendant was sentenced to the
Utah State Prison for "an indeterminate term as provided by law for the crime of unlawfully selling a nareotic drug, as charged," (A.C. 29).

3

On November 5, 1970, the Defendant's Motion for
New Trial based on newly discovered evidence was
heard. The sole prosecution witness to identify the
sample purchased from the Defendant as marijuana was
a chemist and the nature of the Defendant's newly discovered evidence was that the chemical test for marijuana
is inconclusive. The trial court took the matter under
advisement and on the 30th day of November, 1970,
denied the Defendant's Motion (T. 128).
ARGUMENT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION ON ENTRAPMENT.

The trial court refused to give the Defendant's
proposed instruction on entrapment (T. p. 93). This
refusal was apparently based on the fact that the Defendant did not admit his guilt as some cases have
indicated is a prerequisite. However, the better authority to the contrary.
Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court has said in a recent case.
"We disagree with the Attorney General's contention that to invoke the defense of entrapment
a Defendant must admit committing the criminal acts as charged. Although the defense is
available to a Defendant who is otherwise guilty
[citing authority], it does not follow that the
Defendant must admit guilt to establish the defense. A Defendant, for example, may deny that
he committed every element of the crime charged,
yet properly allege that such acts as he did commit were induced by law enforcement officers
4

(People v. West, 139 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 923, 296,
293 P.2d 166; Henderson v. United States (5th
Cir.) 237 F. 2d 169, 173, 61 A.L.R. 2d 666.) Moreover, a Defendant may properly contend that the
evidence shows unlawful police conduct amounting to entrapment without conceding that it also
shows his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Perez, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 401 P.2d
934 (1965)
Justice Traynor, in the Perez case, cites as rationale
for the defense of entrapment the policy that "the court
refuses to enable officers of the law to consumate illegal
or unjust schemes designed to foster rather than prevent
or detect crime." People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 9,
345 P. 2d 928, 933 (1959).
The Defendant had stated to the jury that he intended to rely on the defense of entrapment. The
Defendant was able to show that the agents for the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs were trying
to elicit his "cooperation" and in exchange for this they
were willing to dismiss all charges against Defendant,
and pay him for his services (T. 65-68). Defendant
showed that when the agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs were unable to do
so, they, along with Ron Bridgeforth, a cooperating
person with the Bureau, "built" a case against Defendant (T. 82). Defendant showed that he was hesitant to
sell (T. 80) and that Bridgeforth had to make repeated
requests (T. 80) beforn the "sale" was finally consumated. From this evidence a jury could reasonably find
that the crime was initiated by the law enforcement

5

officers and not the Defendant. In Sherman v. United
States, 356, U.S 369 (1958) the court held, as a matter
of law, that the defense of entrapment was proven undPr
similar circumstances.
In order to show entrapment the Defendant must
show that the police officers initiated, originated and
were the motivating force behind the transaction Sherman, Id.; State v. Perkins, 19 U. 2d 421, 432 P.2d 50
(1967). In establishing that the inducement was illegitimate, the Defendant has a relatively slight burden
United States v. Henry, 417 F. 2d 267 (1969) and
then the burden shifts to the prosecution, at which point
the State must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that
the Defendant was predisposed to commit the crime and
the police were merely affording the defendant an opportunity for the commission of the offense. United States
v. Brown, 421 F. 2d 1283 (1970).
In the instant case the Defendant has shown that
the idea of the sale initiated with the agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, that
they went to considerable lengths to obtain it and that
their reasons for so doing were to obtain the aid of the
Defendant in their undercover activities. At this point
the Defendant had met his burden and was entitled to
have the jury determine the issue of entrapment. Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958); Constitution
of the United States of America, Amendment VI; Constitution of the State of Utah Article I, 10; State v.
Estrada, 227 P.2d 247 (Utah 1951).
6

In the Sherman oase, op. cit., supra, the court suggested several factors to be used in determining whether
the prosecution has met its burden of proving "beyond
a reasonable doubt" that the Defendant had a predisposition to commit the crime and those same factors are
not present here. The Defendant had no past convictions,
nor is there any evidence to indicate that the Defendant
was Pngaged in the trade of selling marijuana, although
there may be some to indicate he was a user. There
is no evidence that Appellant made a profit from this
transaction and as the court stated in Sherman, Id. at
p. 375 "The Government's characterization of Petitioner's
hesitancy to Kalchinian's [ underdcoverman] request as
the natural wariness of the criminal cannot fill the evidentiary void."

Even if this Court should determine that it cannot
find the entrapment defense presented as a matter of
law then it should determine that the issue of entrapment is one of fact for the jury. This court has indicated
in State v. Pacheco, 13, U.2d 148, 369 P. 2d 484 (1962)
that the question of entrapment is for the jury, In.
People v. Valdez, 283 P. 2d 36 (1955) Justice Griffin
has said at pp. 38-39
"Although there may be considerable doubt about
Defendant's story, the factual question should
have been submitted to the jury under proper
instructions. "
and quoting People v. Lawlor, 131 p. 63,
"the failure of the court to charge, at the request
of the Defendant upon any matter of law applic7

able to the facts of the case is tantamount to a
misdirection of the jury."
thus the Appellate Court reversed the lower court for
failure to submit the issue of entrapment to the jury even
though the Defendant's theory was extremenly doubful.
(See also In re Moore, 70 Cal. App. 483, 233 P. 805;
People. v. Lanzit, 70 Cal. App. 498, 233 P. 816; People
v. Lopez, 119 Cal. App. 2d 235, 257 P.2d 670; People
v. Makovsky, 3 Cal. 2d 366, 44 P.2d People v. Roberts,
40 Cal. 2d 483, 254 P. 2d 501; People v. Gallagaher, 107
Cal. App. 425, 290 P. 504; Crisp v. United States, 262, F.
2d 68; United States v. Place, 263 F. 2d 627; Johnsonv.
United States, 317 F.2d 127; Garcia DeLaRosa v. United
States, 418 F. 2d 562; Perez v. United States, 421 F. 2d
562; U mted State v. Pinley, 421 F. 2d 172.)
ARGUMENT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

The Defendant's Motion for New Trial based on
newly discovered evidence was denied by Judge Joseph
,Jeppson (T. 120). The Court recognized that the issue
raised by Defendant's Affidavit in support of his Motion for New Trial was not tried ( T. 128). That issue
was whether or not the State had proven as a matter
of law that the Defendant sold a prohibited, rather than
a permitted portion of the plant Cannabis Sativa, if he
did in fact sell a narcotic drug. One of the elements of
a violation of 58-13a-2 is that the thing sold is a narcotic drug.
The State offered nothing to controvert the Affi8

davit of the State Chemist, Wilford Leiber (Appeal
Cover 21-28) other than a letter from Buddy R. Goldston to Harry Sumega stating generally the procedure
nsed and identifying specifically some things found in
the case of one Ted C. Cowan (Appeal Cover 36).
Your Appellant's name is John Edward Cowan.
Further, the letter would not be competent evidence
since it is unsworn.
This Court has said in State v. Duncan, 78 U. 555,
132 P. 2d 121 (1942) at 124, that
'' l f there is nothing offered to controvert the
affidavits as to evidence newly discovered by the
moving party for the purposes of ruling on the
motion for new trial, the court must asRume that
the facts alleged in the affidavits will be produced
in court in the event a new trial is granted."
If the newly discovered evidence were merely cumulative, then the Court would be justified in denying a
new trial; however, if the evidence went to a:

"vital factor in determining whether or not the
State could possibly prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Defendant was the one who committed the crime "then" the court clearly erred
in not granting the motion for new trial."

In State v. Hawkins, 81 U. 16, 16 P. 2d 713 (1932), at
719, Justice Hansen stated the law with respect to the
granting of new trials as follows:
"It is there said: "In order to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear (1) That the
Pvidence is such as will probably change the re9

sult if a new trial is granted; (2) That it has
been discovered since the trial; (3) That it could
not have been discovered before trial by the exercise of due diligence; ( 4) That it is material to
the issue; ( 5) That it is not merely cumulative
or impeaching."
It is the contention of the Appellant that these requisites have been met as is amply shown by the Affidavit
attached to Defendant's Motion for New Trial (A.C.
21-28), the letter of Buddy R. Goldston (A.C. 36) and
the transcript of the proceedings in connection with his
Motion for New Trial (T. 96-128).
ARGUMENT III
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT THE TRIAL OF
DEFENDANT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
THE VERDICT OF GUILTY.

The evidence was insufficient because it failed to
identify a narcotic drug within 58-13a-2 and because it
subsequently became apparent through Defendant's Motion for New Trial that the test was chemically inaccurate.
At the Defendant's trial, the only evidence presented that the sample contained a narcotic drug within
the meaning of 58-13a-2 was the testimony of the State's
expert witness, Buddy R. Goldston. Mr. Goldston is
an expert in chemistry from thP Laboratory of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in Dalla:;,
Texas. His expertise must be limited to the field of
chemistry.
He testified that, in his opinion, based on his anal10

ys1s, each exhibit contained "marijuana" (T. 70). He
described "marijuana" as a "Narcotic Drug;" however,
that is a legal conclusion, and further, it is an incorrect
legal conclusion.
Not all "marijuana" or "Cannabis Sativa" is a "N areotic Drug." Under 58-13a-1 (14) U.C.A. certain portions
of the plant are excluded from the class of narcotic
drugs, to wit: the mature stalk, the seeds, which are
not capable of germination, etc Further, according to
the Affidavit of Wilford Leiber, assistant State Chemist,
the Duquenois test (used by State's witness [A.C. 36])
is non-specific. That test would give a positive reaction
to stalk or seeds of the plant Cannabis Sativa regardless
of whether a prohibited portion of the plant were present
in the sample (A.C. 21-28). In the letter from Buddy
R. Goldston (A.C. 36) considered by the court in considering Defendant's Motion for New T'rial (T. 168),
Mr. Goldston writes that the samples contained leaves,
stems, and seeds (A.C. 36). Thus if the seeds were
1lee<ls of the plant Cannabis Sativa, then the test would
be positive regardless of what else was present, and
thus inconclusive,
Although Defendant was unaware until after his
trial that the chemical test was non-specific and that
the test used was the Duquenois Levine Color test, his
subsequent awareness and research revealed that the
chemical test for marijuana used at his trial is extremely
<1nestionable. The Dequenois test for Marijuana apparPntly gives a positive reaction to tea, turkish tobacco
and chocolate, according to the Salt Lake Tribune (Roger
11

Rapoport, Salt Lake Tribune, January 17, 1971, p.
A23). The United Nations found that Arthemisia Drancunculus 1., Eucalyptus Glabulus Labill, Satureja Hortensis I., Thymus Vulgaris and Salvia Officinalis 1., and
any plant containing carophyllene or thymol which are
found in many vegetables would react positively to the
Duquenois test. (United Nations Secretariat, Document
St/SOA. S/I, p. 8, cited in Bailey and Rothblatt, Investigation and Preparation of Criminal Cases, pp. 403-404,
1970). Thus if such common herbs as sage and thyme,
as well as many garden vegetables containing carophyllene and thymol will react positively to the chemical test
for marijuana, it should be declared as a matter of
law insufficient evidence on which to base a conviction
for violation of 58-13a-2. Since Buddy R. Goldston is
only qualified to testify as an expert in chemistry, if
his chemical data is incorrect, then his conclusion must
be questioned.
ARGUMENT IV
THE SENTENCE PRONOUNCED BY THE COURT
WAS INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN, AND IF
THE DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN
ACQUITTAL OR NEW TRIAL, THEN THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE SENTENCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH 58-13a-44 (12).

The Defendant was tried and found guilty of the
crime of Unlawfully Selling Marijuana in violation of
58-13a-2. On the 19th day of October, 1970 the Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson pronounced the sentence of the court
as follows.
"The judgment and sentence of this Court is
that you, John Edward Cowan, bP confined and
12

imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term as provided by law fer the crime
of Unlawfully Selling a Narcotic Drug, as
charged." (A.C. 29)
77-35-20 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended provides that:
" ... the court should not fix a definite term of
imprisonment; but the sentence and judgment of
imprisonment in the state prison shall be for a
period of time not less than the minimum and
not to exceed the maximum term provided by law
for the particular crime for which such person
has been convicted." 77-35-20 U.C.A. ibid.
The records of the Utah State Prison show that
f!ley, at various times, thought that the Defendant was
sentenced for 0-5 years and 5 years to life. It is thus
clear beyond question under the rule announced by this
court that the Defendant must be returned to the District Court for proper sentencing [Lee Lim vs. Davis,
75 U. 245 (1929) ]. The sentence pronounced is void for
indefiniteness because it fails to state the minimum and
maximum term which the Defendant may serve as required by 77 -35-20 Utah Code Annotated ( 1953).
ARGUMENT V
77-35-20 PROVIDES THAT THE JUDGE MUST SENTENCE THE DEFENDANT TO THE TERM PROIDED BY LAW AND SINCE THERE IS DOUBT OR
UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHICH OF TWO PUNISHMENTS IS APPLICABLE, THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE LESSER.

Section 20 of Chapter 35 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is clear and to the effect that the Judge
mu:-;t sentence to the term provided by law and has
13

no discretion to provide a different term; however, there
is great confusion as to what that term provided by
law is.
The accused in the instant case was convicted of
selling marijuana in violation of 58-13a-2. Various persons have been sentenced to not less than one year
(e.g. State v. Helen Richards, No. 1555 District Court,
Cache County, Utah, October 2, 1970) and five years to
life with a minimum of three years before probation
(e.g. State v. Kerry Foster, No. 22614 District Court,
Salt Lake County, Utah, October 6, 1970) for violation
of 58-13a-2. Section 58-13a-2 does not itself prescribe its
penalty.
58-13a-44 Utah Code Annotated as amended purports to be the penalty section of the Uniform Narcotic
Drug Act; however, only two subsections thereof provide penalties for the preceding sections of the act, to
wit: 58-13a-44 (1) and 58-13a-44 (12). The remainder of
58-13a-44 provides various substantive crimes and includes the penalties therefore.
58-13a-44 (3) creates a crime of possessing for sale marijuana, 58-13a44 ( 4) creates a crime of transporting, importing, furnishing, giving away, administering or sellin marijuana, 58-13a-44 ( 5) creates a crime of employing
a minor in transporting carrying, selling, giving away,
furnishing, administering, etc. marijauna, 58-13a-44 (6) 14

(9) creates crimes similar to 13a-44 (2) - (5) for any
narcotic other than marijuana, 58-13a-44 (10) makes it a

crime for a minor to induce another minor under 19 to
violate the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, and 58-13a-44
(11) makes it a crime to be under the influence of narcotics; of the foregoing, only 44( 4) and 44( 6) C(}lllceivably
refer to other sections of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act,
However, the better view is that the 38th Legislature
created several new substantive crimes which were designed to get at the sources of narcotic drug traffic,
the pushers. These new crimes were created in 58-13a44 (2) - (11).

58-13a-44 (1) and 58-13a-44 (12) were thus left to
cover the other crimes enumerated in the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. Clearly 58-13a-44 (1) does not apply
to a violation of 58-13a-2, thus 58-13a-44 (12) must, and
that section makes the punishment,
"for the first offense by a fine of not less than
$1,000 nor more than $10,000 or by imprisonment
in the Utah State Prison for not less than one
year or by both such fine and imprisonment ... "
It is contended that if the Defendant is returned for
resentencing, he should be sentenced in conformity with
58-13a-44 (12).

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully contended from the foregoing
15

arguments that appellants' conviction should be reversed
and the sentence set aside or alternatively set the conviction aside and remand the case for new trial or alternatively the case should be remanded for sentencing
under 58-13a-44 (12)
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES A. McINTYRE
425 South 4th East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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